wulun811 / dsh-plugin-vet

@jieai/dsh-plugin-vet — Trust pipeline for DSH plugins

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Before installing any plugin, run it through dsh-plugin-vet: static rules produce a verdict (deterministic, unforgeable), the agent investigates sensitive points and quality issues following the vet-audit-protocol skill (no one can substitute for that), and a final scorecard is handed to a human/model to decide.

Positioning: a monitoring alarm, not an enforcer. vet only does "check → alarm → advise": checks at write time (static scan), watches at run time (runtime guard), and surfaces alarms (scorecard + GUI shield status light). vet never acts on your behalf — it never auto-uninstalls, never kills processes, never rewrites configs; deny mode is an explicit opt-in by the deployer and is not part of the product identity. The final disposition is always decided by the user on their own DSH.

@jieai/dsh-plugin-vet is the trust-layer plugin in the deepseek-harness ecosystem: it occupies the whole download → scan → audit → score → decide → runtime watch trust pipeline. The runtime watch ships built-in honeypot lures: anyone quietly rifling through key files gets caught red-handed (opt-in, honeypot.enabled). It does not provide a plugin marketplace itself (catalog/distribution).

• 📚 Architecture: docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
• 🧾 Audit protocol: AUDIT_PROTOCOL.md
• 🛡️ Security policy: SECURITY.md
• 🤝 Contributing: CONTRIBUTING.md

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Installation

dsh plugin --profile <profile> add @jieai/dsh-plugin-vet

Install-and-activate chain: pnpm install → reconcilePlugins reads dsh.bundle → on next start loadProfile resolves the bundle and mounts the plugin. Default configuration is in the Config section below (fail-open: reports only, never blocks).

Local tarball install (offline or verify-before-release scenario):

dsh plugin --profile <profile> add ./jieai-dsh-plugin-vet-0.1.4.tgz
# or unpack directly into the profile's node_modules:
# tar -xzf jieai-dsh-plugin-vet-0.1.4.tgz -C ~/.dsh/profiles/<profile>/node_modules/@jieai/
// and add an insert mount entry in the profile's cordis.patch.yml:
//   - insert:
//       - id: plugin-vet
//         name: '@jieai/dsh-plugin-vet'
//         config:
//           mode: report
//           autoScan: true

Paths / relative paths / URLs all work (dsh plugin add falls back to pnpm's file: protocol; a local tgz is resolved directly).

First-install time note: the first dsh plugin add into a large profile can take several minutes — during that time pnpm does a full dependency resolution, updates the lockfile for 500+ packages and runs supply-chain policy validation over the whole dependency tree (vet itself carries only 2 runtime dependencies; the bulk of the time is parsing/validating the profile's existing tree, not vet). Subsequent installs/updates take seconds (validation results are reused).

Compatibility: vet targets DSH 0.1.0-rc.6+ (peer range ^0.1.0-rc.6). pnpm may warn about unmet peer dependencies — this is expected: profile templates set autoInstallPeers: false, and at runtime the packages resolve from the DSH install closure ($DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules fallback layer); you neither need nor should install another copy of the cordis family in the profile.

Watch scope = the profile vet is installed into. vet's guards are in-process events (internal/plugin) — whichever profile vet is installed into is the one whose loaded plugins it guards. For multi-profile deployments, install vet into every profile you want guarded (dsh plugin --profile <name> add @jieai/dsh-plugin-vet) and point requireAudit at the matching profile's cordis.patch.yml.

Config (cordis.yml)

Key	Default	Description
mode	report	report reports only, never blocks; deny explicitly enables blocking
autoScan	true	Automatically static-scan new plugins (internal/plugin)
scannerTimeoutMs	15000	Static-scan subprocess timeout
requireAudit	false	Audit gate (opt-in): when enabled, loading a new plugin checks ~/.dsh/vet/audits/ for a health record — without one, report mode logs a yellow audit-required alarm, deny mode blocks. Records are written to disk by hand by the agent following the vet-audit-protocol skill
rules	{} (all on)	Per-rule switches (R1-R12)
denyOn	critical	Blocking threshold in mode: deny
allowlist	[]	Package/plugin-id allowlist (skip scanning)
runtimeGuard	off	Runtime guard (performance/stability cost, opt-in): off = disabled; watch enables the T1 sentinel + T2 hooks, alarm-only
runtimeIntervalMs	2000	T1 sentinel /proc sampling interval
runtimeMemLimitMb	2048	T1 memory alarm threshold (host VmRSS, over limit → red)
runtimeForkBurstN	5	T1 child-process burst alarm threshold (single-round delta → red)
runtimeFdLimit	512	T1 file-descriptor alarm threshold (→ yellow)
runtimeGrowthMb	256	T1 sustained memory-growth alarm threshold (net RSS growth over the full window → yellow, suspected leak; an early-window spike does not count as window-level sustained growth, so no false positive)
runtimeGrowthWindowMs	600000	Growth-detection window (default 10 minutes)
honeypot.enabled	false	Honeypot lures (needs runtimeGuard: watch): plants fake key lures in honeypot.dir; T2 reports touches (read/write/delete) of lure paths as a separate honeypot alarm class. Directory/file names and contents carry no honeypot keywords (anti-honeypot), default location ~/.dsh/.local, lure values are well-formed but invalid fake credentials
honeypot.dir	''	Lure directory; empty = $HOME/.dsh/.local
osvCheck	true	Query Google OSV for known vulnerabilities when scanning package.json (exact-version queries only: ranges (*/>=/^/~) and version-less main packages are skipped, P3-1/P3-3 — avoids stale full-history false positives; since round-7 ranges are no longer stripped to query as exact lower bounds). Verified targets = the plugin itself + direct dependencies (cap 8, official @deepseek-ai/* packages skipped, P3-10); transitive trees exceed the OSV v1 scope and the scan budget. Default on sends package names to api.osv.dev; network failure degrades silently. Set false if privacy-sensitive

Official @deepseek-ai/* packages are exempt by default (built-in trust).

Tools

• scan_plugin — deterministic static scan: target = dynamic-code (source string) / package (package directory) / file (single file). Returns a scorecard (verdict + staticScore + findings). The verdict is produced only by static rules.
• vet-audit-protocol (skill) — audit-process protocol (AUDIT_PROTOCOL.md): the agent audits a new plugin in preset steps — scan_plugin static criteria (incl. R12 Cordis/DSH contract) → read manifest/source → verify each finding → proactively dig deeper (network/files/processes/credentials/library semantics) → contract & code-quality audit (step 4.5: entry/Config-schema consistency, error handling/synchronous blocking/resource leaks/async correctness and other "badly written" issues — statically clean ≠ worth installing) → hand-write a health record to ~/.dsh/vet/audits/<plugin>-<version>-<ts>.md using the system write capability. vet ships no audit tooling and does not investigate for the agent — it only provides the criteria and the on-disk convention.

Automatic behavior

• internal/plugin auto-scan (autoScan: true): newly installed third-party npm packages are static-scanned on load; deny mode + verdict ≥ denyOn → load rolled back.
• Audit gate (requireAudit: true): loading a third-party plugin without a health record — report mode logs a yellow audit-required alarm (enters the /vet/status.json alarm list, plugin loads normally); deny mode rolls back the load (references vet-audit-protocol as a prompt to audit first). Records match by exact version (P-1): after a plugin upgrade the old version's record no longer authorizes the new version — re-audit is required to clear the alarm/block.
• tools/execute interception: cordis_define / run_code / workflow are scanned before execution (cordis_run's real schema carries no code payload, so the guard slot stays dormant — P3-11 synced); report mode prefixes non-clean results with VET: (clean executions don't pollute machine-readable output), deny mode blocks outright (isError).
• Runtime guard (runtimeGuard: watch) — alarm-only:
  • T1 sentinel: a sidecar subprocess reads the host /proc every runtimeIntervalMs (VmRSS / child-process count / fd count) and streams alarm JSON lines back to the host → shield turns yellow/red.
  • T2 hooks: in-process wrappers around fs / child_process (incl. fs.promises); dangerous operations (sensitive-path writes/deletes, key-file reads, subprocesses with shell/download/exfiltration keywords, honeypot-lure touches, ~/.dsh config-root reconnaissance) are attributed via the stack to the plugin package name before alarming; official packages get full-class noise reduction via attribution (capability grant — official packages are the platform itself; their high-frequency ~/.dsh session/config/storage reads don't spam; third parties can't forge attribution). Never blocks a call. Self-harm exemptions (fixed after real-world false positives):
    • node_modules package-directory exemption: package names/inner files are public artifacts — package names containing credential/secret words are normal ecosystem (@aws-sdk/credential-provider-*, @deepseek-ai/dsh-credentials-local, etc.), and both host module resolution (require.resolve's internal realpathSync/stat of inner package.json) and vet's own scan reads touch them at high frequency, so they no longer false-positive as fs-probe; path segments before node_modules still judged normally (~/.ssh/node_modules/x still hits .ssh), and write/delete of system roots (/usr etc.) still alarms.
    • Attribution excludes vet itself: the wrapper frame is always the top of the alarm stack, and the vet root never participates in attribution mapping — host/unowned alarms are no longer pinned on vet (the alarm still fires, attributed to the real caller).
    • Toolchain temp artifacts (tsc <src>.<pid>.<uuid>.tmpdir, *.tmp, *.temp, *.swp, etc.) are auto-exempt — the secrets/credentials in their names are just source filenames being compiled; deleting them is cleanup, not destruction; parent segments still judged normally (~/.ssh/config.bak still alarms).
• GUI shield: a browser half registers into conversation.session.header.actions and polls /vet/status.json to show a green/yellow/red light + alarm count. Activation requires a dsh web restart (client-modules only scans the dsh.client declaration at startup).
  • Interaction: clickable — clicking expands the alarm panel (live metrics: memory/CPU/I-O/ child-process/fd; guard status: when off, one click writes a runtimeGuard: watch config (takes effect on restart); alarm list with severity/attribution/per-item advice; recent-scan echo, refresh, updated time), outside clicks close it; when alarms exist a count badge appears next to the shield (green/yellow/red theme color, light/dark adaptive).
  • Per-item dismiss: each alarm can be "dismissed" — display-only (no longer counts toward shield level or count), the record is kept and can be "restored"; a dismissed alarm auto-expires once the alarm stops, so a recurrence is visible again (and can be dismissed again). Dismiss state shares the alarm store's lifecycle (resets on restart). Auth boundary (P3-12 recorded): dismiss/restore only do same-origin validation (alarm-only display-layer risk — a same-origin page script could hide alarms, but records aren't deleted and nothing else is affected; acceptable within the system).
  • Display caps: the panel shows the latest 8 alarms; the store is a ring buffer capped at 20, deduped per id within 60s, 24h TTL (sustained triggers naturally renew) — 100 alarms are not displayed in full, and needn't be (new alarms push out the oldest). Recent-scan echo (suspicious → yellow) also expires on the 24h TTL (P3-2: one suspicious scan no longer turns the shield permanently yellow; sustained scanning renews naturally).

Static rule table (R1-R14)

ID	Name	Default level	Scope	Determinism
R1	constructor-chain escape	critical	code + files	certain/likely
R2	Dynamic execution (eval/Function/import/require)	high (files) / medium (code; bin entries drop to medium)	both	certain/likely
R3	Direct process access (runtime-graded; read-only members/generic/bin entries/app-type packages → info)	critical (host) / high (sandbox)	both	certain
R4	Host closure capture (agent/TextEncoder…) + host-global prototype pollution	critical (code) / high (files, independent of targetKind)	both	certain/likely
R5	ctx-escape attempt signal (withheld members/undeclared services; ctx.logger and other officially injected services are allowlisted)	medium	code only	likely
R6	String coarse-scan fallback (obfuscation signals need combined evidence with dynamic execution)	info	both	heuristic
R7	Hardcoded secrets	high	both	likely
R9	Resource safety (unbounded allocation / exit-less synchronous loops / spawn-in-loop / ReDoS / non-terminating recursion / growth patterns in loops)	high (allocation/dead-loop/fork) / medium (ReDoS/recursion/Map.set) / info (resident loops/+=/Promise.all)	both	certain/likely/heuristic
R10	Supply chain (package.json install hooks / dependency manifest)	high (install hooks) / info (dependency manifest)	files	likely/heuristic
R11	Destructive file operations (fs deletes / sensitive-path reads-writes)	high (sensitive paths) / medium (deletes)	both	likely
R12	Cordis/DSH contract (entry file / bundle-patch declaration / name / engines.node)	high (missing patch / missing entry) / medium (no entry / missing name) / info (low node version)	files	certain/likely
R13	Hardcoded network exfiltration sinks (Discord/Telegram/Slack webhooks, cloud-metadata endpoints, .onion) in string literals	high	both	likely
R14	Download-and-exec primitives in shipped non-JS scripts (.sh/.bash/.ps1/.cmd/.bat: curl	sh, encoded PowerShell, IEX, certutil…)	high (plugin) / info (generic)	files

Scoring model

staticScore = max(0, 100 - Σ(severity weight × hits × confidence coefficient))

verdict (the single authoritative judgment; heuristics never upgrade): critical ≥ 1 → critical; otherwise high ≥ 1 → suspicious; otherwise → clean. The verdict is produced only by the static layer: staticScore and verdict are shown separately and never merged into a single total.

Capability boundary (honest list)

Static scanning is a "speed bump + forensics layer", not a security boundary. The following is split by impact on the verdict, and the forms it explicitly does not detect are listed truthfully (all empirically verified).

Detected — verdict-level (changes the verdict)

Rule	Problem class	Hit → verdict	Verified
R1	Constructor-chain escape: x.constructor("return process") / x["constructor"]("return " + "process") / new (globalThis.constructor.constructor)("return process")() (dot/bracket-access + new forms; string args statically evaluable: literals/templates/concatenation/const bindings; new supports const-alias tracking)	critical	matrix + multi-file ✓
R2	Dynamic execution: eval() / Function() / new Function / new AsyncFunction (incl. parenthesized new (Function)(...); escape-string args → critical) / (async)=>{}.constructor capture (round-7.2: new X.constructor reported only when the base is a function literal — new n.constructor(n.type, n) object-clone no longer false-positives) / vm.runInContext/runInNewContext / dynamic import() / require()	high (files) / medium (code, escape-string → critical); bin entries judged as generic code, drop to medium	matrix + round-7/7.2 regression ✓
R3	Direct process access: getBuiltinModule/mainModule/module/exit (incl. reallyExit) → critical; side-effect members (kill/abort/chdir/umask/setuid/dlopen/binding, etc.) and unknown members → high; read-only members (round-7.1): env/cwd/platform/pid/argv/execPath/stdin/stdout/stderr/nextTick/on, etc. → info capability surface (reading cwd/env/pid isn't an escape channel; no-bin MCP/tool plugins like bridges no longer get hurt); runtime='sandbox' caps at high; shape degradation: generic packages / bin entry files / app-type packages → info	critical / high / info	matrix + round-7.1 regression ✓
R4	Host-closure capture: reading .constructor of agent/parallel/pipeline/phase/log/TextEncoder/TextDecoder/btoa/atob or feeding Object.getPrototypeOf (code scenario); host-global prototype pollution: <builtin>.prototype.<member> = ... override assignments and Object.defineProperty(<builtin>.prototype, ...) (Object/Array/String/Function/TextEncoder/URL/Buffer and 40+ builtins, round-7)	critical (code) / high (files, since round-7.1 independent of targetKind — pollution semantics don't distinguish plugins from generic packages, generic no longer drops to info)	matrix + round-7 regression ✓
R7	Hardcoded secrets: sk- / AKIA / AIza / gh[pousr]_ / xox[baprs]- / env-var assignment / URL-embedded keys (placeholders excluded)	high → suspicious	matrix ✓
R9	Resource safety: new Array(2**31) / Buffer.alloc(1GB) unbounded allocation (≥1e8), while(true)/for(;;) exit-less synchronous loops (freezes the host; round-7.2: a labeled break whose label wraps the loop — outer: for(;;){ ... break outer } — counts as an exit signal), spawn/exec/fork/new Worker in exit-less loops (fork bomb)	high → suspicious; ReDoS nested quantifiers (a+)+-class and overlapping alternation branches `(a	aa)+→ medium (first-char-disjoint branches like(?:[^']
R10	Supply chain: preinstall/install/postinstall/uninstall hooks in package.json scripts (arbitrary code execution at install time) → high; dependency manifest → info (known-vulnerability check: OSV exact-version query, osvCheck can be disabled)	high → suspicious (install hooks)	matrix ✓
R11	Destructive file operations: fs.unlink/rm/rmdir(+Sync) deleting sensitive paths (/etc/root/.ssh etc.) → high, plain deletes → medium; fs.writeFile etc. writing sensitive paths → high; fs.readdir traversing sensitive directories → medium	high → suspicious (sensitive paths); medium not into verdict	matrix ✓
R12	Cordis/DSH contract: missing declared dsh.bundle.patch file → high; no entry (no main/exports["."] and no root index.js) → medium; declared entry file missing → high; plugin-intent package missing name → medium; engines.node major < 22 → info	high → suspicious (declared mount point/entry missing means guaranteed failure); medium/info not into verdict	matrix ✓
R13	Network exfil: hardcoded Discord/Telegram/Slack webhooks, cloud-metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254 / metadata.*.internal / 100.100.100.200) and .onion destinations in string literals	high → suspicious	matrix + R13 tests ✓
R14	Non-JS scripts: curl	sh, wget	sh, PowerShell download-pipe / -enc / IEX, certutil/bitsadmin/mshta/regsvr32/rundll32 in .sh/.bash/.ps1/.cmd/.bat (generic → info)

Detected — advisory level (downgrades score only, never changes the verdict)

Rule	Problem class	Note
R5	ctx-escape attempt signal: accessing sandbox-withheld framework members / undeclared services (ctx.plugin, etc.)	code scenario only; medium
R6	String coarse scan: concatenated escape features, getBuiltinModule/child_process/dangerous-require module references, obfuscation features (String.fromCharCode/Buffer.from(base64)/atob(/charCodeAt — since round-7 reported only when combined with an in-file dynamic-execution signal (eval/new Function/vm etc.); routine byte handling for terminal protocols/encoding no longer false-positives)	info/heuristic
R8	Scan timeout / file-too-large skip	info meta-rule

Runtime monitoring (when runtimeGuard: watch) — alarm only

Layer	Mechanism	Catches	Limits
T1 sentinel	Subprocess polling host /proc	Memory bomb (>memLimit), sustained memory growth (leak; net window growth alarms by multiple), fork bomb (child-process burst), fd surge	Granularity = host-global (plugins share the process; can't attribute to a plugin)
T2 hooks	In-process wrapping of fs/child_process (incl. fs.promises)	Sensitive-path writes/deletes (/etc, ~/.ssh, .env…), key-file reads, spawn with shell/download-exfiltration keywords	Stack attribution best-effort; per-call wrapper overhead (I/O-heavy <5%, hot paths 10-20% range)
Shield	Browser conversation.session.header.actions + /vet/status.json	Green/yellow/red light + alarm count	Requires dsh web restart to activate

Explicitly not detected (empirically verified)

Form	Empirical result
Indirect references: alias function const f = Function; f(...), process["getBuiltinModule"], globalThis.process, indirect eval (0, eval)	R6 info or zero findings, verdict=clean
Runtime/externally constructed payloads: base64 strings, hex/charCode assembly, reading code from network/env/args, self-modifying code	base64 constructor string tested → zero findings
Non-source files: .jsx/.tsx/.vue/.json/binaries/wasm	Not in the scan surface; shell/PowerShell/batch scripts (.sh/.bash/.ps1/.cmd/.bat) are covered by R14 (download-and-exec)
Dependency chain/supply chain: import/require graph, dependency-version vulnerabilities, package.json scripts/install hooks, licenses, author reputation	Not parsed
Runtime behavior: network exfiltration, dynamic prototype-pollution chains, dead loops/resource exhaustion, timing, permission abuse	No dataflow/behavior analysis; static <builtin>.prototype override assignments are caught by R4 (round-7)
Semantic knowledge: the actual services a plugin injects, process in bundler polyfills, shadowing boundary	R5 only recognizes 4 variable names; shadowing check is a v1 heuristic (undercounts)
Legitimate process use by host tool packages (process.env config reads, process.stdin/stdout protocol, process.execPath spawn)	Resolved: targetKind grading — non-DSH plugin packages/official packages (generic) downgrade R3/R2/R10/R9 dead-loop to capability-surface/advice (info/medium), not into verdict; DSH plugin packages stay strict. round-7 adds shape downgrades: app-type packages (package.json declares bin) and bin entry files are likewise downgraded to capability surface; round-7.1 read-only member classification: pure read-only members (cwd/env/platform/pid, etc.) drop to info even in plugin mode (no-bin MCP/tool plugins like bridges no longer hurt); side-effect/escape members (kill/exit, etc.) stay high/critical. 195 official packages tested all clean

Trust boundaries

1. The verdict is produced only by the deterministic static layer — rules are regex/AST judgments, not spoofable by prompt injection.
2. The static layer is physically isolated from plugin code — the scanner is a separate process; the AST is read-only and never eval'd.
3. Review goes through the agent protocol — the agent follows the vet-audit-protocol skill steps (static criteria first, sensitive points dug into one by one); the verdict is unaffected by the review step.
4. No single merged score — merging the verdict with subjective assessment is forbidden, to avoid polluting the verdict boundary.
5. This product is not a security boundary — positioned as a "speed bump + forensics layer" (bypassable forms in Known Limitations 1 below, aligned with DSH's official stance).
6. Fail-open by default — default mode: report; deny is explicitly enabled by the deployer.
7. Alarm-only — the runtime guard only watches, never kills; vet's automatic behavior (deny interception) exists only in the explicitly enabled opt-in mode. Alarms only carry advice; disposition is always left to the user on their DSH.

Known Limitations

1. Static scanning is not a security boundary: obfuscated/encoded/dynamically generated code can bypass the AST rules; R6 only provides a "suspicious" signal. 1b. Source enumeration limits: internal/plugin auto-scan only recursively collects ≤6 levels deep, non-hidden (non-dot-prefixed) .js/.ts/.mjs/.cjs files — deep or hidden directories are silently unscanned (no warning); use scan_plugin(target=package) manually for a full directory scan.
2. Agent review can be prompt-injected: the verdict never comes from the review step, but the agent may miss things — the confidence field lets users know.
3. internal/plugin guard doesn't cover runtime dynamic-mount escapes: the vm path is intercepted at the call layer by the tools/execute guard.
4. R5 is code-only: ctx access in files scenarios isn't reported by default (high false-positive rate).
5. Scan duration: large plugin packages may time out and skip (R8 info); agent review proceeds per the vet-audit-protocol steps.
6. The verdict is the static layer's deterministic judgment; the agent's subjective assessment is recorded in the health record and doesn't constitute a security guarantee.
7. /vet/status.json has no auth: the shield's polling needs anonymous GET, and the route itself isn't authenticated — if dsh web binds to a non-loopback address, LAN clients can read scan conclusions/alarm targets. vet is an alarm-only observer and won't overreach into access control; if you care, keep loopback binding or trust your network (the POST guard toggle already has same-origin validation; no-Origin requests are rejected).
8. @deepseek-ai/* is trusted by default: if the official ecosystem is ever compromised, tighten this (v1 keeps the switch). scan_plugin judges official packages as generic (capability-surface downgrade) — an official-package supply-chain attack would let static downgrade mask process access (recorded, P-5; official packages are the platform itself, same policy as the internal/plugin official exemption). vet's own exemption is likewise narrowed (P-3): it now matches by name AND verifies via realpath that the target is the current vet instance — a same-name impostor package (file: install has no registry validation) is judged by the strictest plugin rules.
9. R10's known-vulnerability check depends on an OSV network query: on by default, sending "package name + exact version" to api.osv.dev (disclosed in the README config section; set osvCheck: false if you care); network failure/timeout degrades silently to skip (never false-blocks); only exact versions are queried — */>=/^/~ ranges and version-less main packages are skipped (P3-1/P3-3; round-7 fix: ^/~ no longer strip their prefix to query as exact lower bounds — the lower bound being affected while the actually installed version is already fixed would false-positive). Indirect transitive dependencies are not in the check surface.
10. R11 only recognizes fs.* forms: destructured/aliased calls (const { unlinkSync } = require('fs')) and runtime paths are missed (empirically recorded; a static boundary).
11. T1/T2 are "security cameras", not "vaults": they catch obvious mischief (memory/fork bombs, sensitive-path operations, third-party spawn) but not worker threads/native plugins/low-traffic slow exfiltration; T2 doesn't cover ESM named-import snapshots, process.binding, and other side channels.
12. T2 attribution & noise reduction: stack attribution is best-effort (shared services/timers across plugins can mis-attribute); official-package spawn is not alarmed by default (capability grant).
13. Shield activation requires a dsh web restart: client-modules scans the dsh.client declaration at startup; the browser won't load the shield before the restart, but the /vet/status.json endpoint and the runtime guard (host side) take effect on restart.
14. Runtime guard is off by default (runtimeGuard: 'off'): wrapping fs/child_process carries performance and stability costs; opt-in.
15. process.kill stays high (intentional, round-7.1): kill is a side-effect member and doesn't degrade with the read-only members — but a plugin killing its own spawned child (MCP/bridge-style) is a normal capability surface (dsh-bridges tested: 98/134 cleared; the remaining highs are all process.kill in run.js/util.js). Statically distinguishing process.kill(child.pid) (pid from this package's own spawn return) from arbitrary pids needs dataflow analysis — high cost, low benefit; kept as-is, to be ruled out manually by the agent during vet-audit-protocol review (conclusion recorded in the health record).
16. Platform support (Linux-first, graceful degradation elsewhere): the static scan layer (scanner-bin / scan_plugin / R1-R12 / OSV), T2 runtime hooks, honeypot, GUI shield and audit protocol are all pure JS and run cross-platform (macOS/Windows). The T1 sentinel is Linux-only: it depends on /proc for VmRSS/children/fd; on non-Linux the sentinel exits gracefully and the metrics panel falls back to -1/0 (no errors, no log spam, by design). T2 sensitive paths match by path-segment name (backslashes are normalized, so .ssh/.env/credentials etc. hit on Windows too), but the "system-root prefix" (/etc /usr /var) is POSIX-shaped: on Windows, write/delete of C:\Windows\System32-style paths bypasses the system-root judgment (segment-name/keyword checks still apply); macOS has /etc /usr /var, so T2 is fully functional. Consistent with DSH current Linux-first adaptation state.

Development

npm run build       # scanner-bin + src compiled to lib/ + client bundle
npm run typecheck   # full tsc --noEmit
npm test            # build + vitest (250 cases, incl. coverage thresholds)
npx vitest run --coverage   # coverage report (lines/functions >= 70%, branches >= 50%)

Layout: scanner-bin/ static engine (separate process); src/ plugin body (tools/guards/audit/report/guard); src/client/ GUI shield; test/ fixtures + unit tests + adversarial matrix. Architecture in docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

License

MIT.